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526 
CRAFT BEER DRINKERS REIGNITE 
THE WINE WARS 
Shirley Chen 
INTRODUCTION 
he rise of craft beers draws attention back to the longstand-
ing debate surrounding state law regulations on the direct 
shipment of alcohol to consumers across state lines.1 At the fore-
front of this debate is the ever-existing tension between the 
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the Unit-
ed States Constitution.2 Specifically, the issue was pronounced 
during what was known as the wine wars of the 1990s and 
2000s.3 Although the United States Supreme Court seemingly set-
tled the matter in the seminal case of Granholm v. Heald,4 subse-
quent case holdings have illustrated that confusion surrounding 
the extent of the states’ power in alcohol regulation still exists and 
that the courts’ decisions are dependent upon a narrow or broad 
interpretation of Granholm.5 For example, state regulations that 
do not forbid, but rather limit the scope of producers’ ability to 
directly ship wine have been questioned on the same constitu-
                                                          
  J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola University Chicago School of 
Law. 
 1  Daniel Fromson, Beer’s Black Market, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/beers-black-
market/2011/09/01/gIQAsL0D7J_story.html. 
 2  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; See also 
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005); Kevin C. Quigley, Note, Uncork-
ing Granholm: Extending The Nondiscrimination Principle To All Interstate 
Commerce In Wine, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1871, 1873-74 (2011). 
 3  William Echikson et al., Wine War, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 
2, 2001), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2001-09-02/wine-war. 
 4  See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466 (holding that the Twenty-first Amend-
ment does not authorize or permit laws that violate the Commerce Clause). 
 5  Quigley, supra note 2, at 1888-93; William C. Green, Creating A Com-
mon Market For Wine: Boutique Wines, Direct Shipment, And State Alcohol 
Regulation, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13, 42 (2012). 
T 
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tional grounds, resulting in a circuit split.6 In addition, wine re-
tailers continue to advocate that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Granholm likewise extends to them, not just to wine producers.7 
These ambiguities in the law, which have yet to be resolved fol-
lowing the wine wars, illustrate the uphill battle that the craft 
beer industry has to look forward to in addition to some unique 
nuances of beer regulation. 
This Article not only discusses the still present debate re-
garding direct shipment of alcohol to consumers, but also why the 
trend in the popularity of craft beers, coupled with the ever-
growing strength of e-commerce, has made it imperative to settle 
this dispute. In particular, this Article highlights the consumer 
impact of state alcohol regulations and the dangers posed by the 
efforts to diminish or even eliminate the effects of Granholm’s 
original holding. 
Part One of this Article will discuss a brief history of alco-
hol regulation in the United States, beginning with the passage of 
the Twenty-first Amendment and the states’ creation of the 
three-tier regulatory system following the Amendment’s enact-
ment. It then explores the system’s contention with the Com-
merce Clause in determining the extent to which states can regu-
late alcohol across interstate boundaries in the context of the wine 
industry. Next, it explains the culmination of the wine wars in 
Granholm. And lastly, this part highlights subsequent interpreta-
tions of the case to show how Granholm has not been the peace 
treaty for which consumers, producers, retailers, and wholesalers 
had hoped.8 
Part Two addresses the history and growth of the craft 
beer industry and culture.9 Particularly, it draws parallels to the 
growth of boutique wineries in the late 1990s and early 2000s in 
conjunction with the rise of e-commerce. 
Part Three explains the regulations that currently exist in 
the shipment of craft beers and how it differs from present regu-
                                                          
 6  See Green, supra note 5, at 43. 
 7  Quigley, supra note 2, at 1904; See also Desireé C. Slaybaugh, A Twisted 
Vine: The Aftermath Of Granholm v. Heald, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 265, 
278-82 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of “shippers” in its opin-
ion showed its intent to apply the holding beyond the producer level of the 
three-tier system). 
 8  Green, supra note 5, at 60. 
 9  See BREWERS ASS’N, History of Craft Brewing, 
http://www.brewersassociation.com/pages/about-us/history-of-craft-brewing 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
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lations surrounding wine shipments. In addition, it introduces 
another barrier to state regulation and consumer protection 
through the phenomenon of a black market for beer through In-
ternet purchases. Thus, this section identifies precisely why 
changes in state regulations matter in the context of consumer 
choice and consumer protection. 
Finally, Part Four proposes a settlement between the 
longstanding dispute and the overall benefits this settlement 
would provide consumers. 
I.  BACKGROUND: BRIEF HISTORY OF ALCOHOL 
REGULATION SINCE PROHIBITION 
A.  Twenty-first Amendment and the Three-tier System 
Prohibition officially ended with the repeal of the Eight-
eenth Amendment through the passage of the Twenty-first 
Amendment.10 As such, the future of regulation had to address 
the issues that Prohibition had attempted but failed to attack. For 
example, while Prohibition sought to conform to social and moral 
attitudes towards the evils of excessive alcohol consumption, it 
not only failed in its original goals but also sparked a complex 
and expansive crime network throughout the country.11 Accord-
ingly, the Twenty-first Amendment left control to the states to de-
termine a regulatory system with the idea that the state could bet-
ter tackle the concerns that prompted Prohibition in the first 
place as well as the unfortunate by-products of that era.12 States 
were now charged with the task of reducing, if not eliminating 
the abuse of alcohol consumption, eradicating all forms of law-
lessness associated with the sale of alcohol that dominated the 
Prohibition era, and regulating alcohol within the state in an ap-
propriate, efficient, and effective manner.13 
                                                          
 10  See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; See also Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy 
J. Painter, Why We Control Alcohol the Way We Do, in SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL: THE 21ST AMENDMENT IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 1, 8 (Carole J. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008). 
 11  Id. 
 12  See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; See also WINE AND SPIRITS DISTRIB. OF 
ILL., REGULATION OF BEVERAGE ALCOHOL IN ILLINOIS: UNDERSTANDING 
THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM (2011). 
 13  Evan T. Lawson, The Future of the Three-Tiered System as a Control of 
Marketing Alcoholic Beverages, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF 
ALCOHOL: THE 21ST AMENDMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 31, 104 (Carole J. 
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 98 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 98 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
C M
Y K
Chen Article2.docx (Do Not Delete)  5/21/2014  2:42 PM 
2014 Craft Beer Drinkers Reignite the Wine Wars 529 
Thus emerged the three-tier system. Prior to Prohibition, 
vertical integration often occurred in which producers of alcohol 
were either the retailers themselves or yielded significant control 
over them.14 In fact, many of the moral evils that Prohibition 
sought to combat were attributed to this vertically integrated sys-
tem because there was a perception that producer-retailers in a 
free market system encouraged large amounts of alcohol con-
sumption and indulgence to increase profits at whatever social 
costs.15 After the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment, states 
implemented a three-tier system, adding a wholesaler level to in-
sulate producers from retailers. Not only did the three-tier system 
address the concerns of excessive alcohol consumption, but it also 
attacked Prohibition’s criminal networks that arose.16 By separat-
ing the production end from the retail end, the system aimed to 
curtail bootleg sales of wine17 and reinforce a state controlled reg-
ulatory scheme to keep alcohol distribution out of the hands of 
organized crime.18 Currently, states like Illinois propose in its in-
formational pamphlet, “Wine and Spirits Distrib. of Ill., Regula-
tion of Beverage Alcohol in Illinois: Understanding the Three-
Tier System” that the three-tier system accomplishes a variety of 
goals: “To ensure and maximize verifiable tax revenues that can 
be collected efficiently from the beverage alcohol industry. To fa-
cilitate state and local control of alcoholic beverages. To encour-
age moderate, legal consumption. [And] [t]o provide an orderly, 
effective market.”19 
In practice, the producer sells the alcohol to the wholesal-
er, which in turn distributes and sells it to the retailer. Finally, the 
retailer markets and sells the alcohol to the consumer. The sale 
and purchase of the alcohol is taxed at each level, increasing the 
price of the final product that the consumer eventually purchas-
es.20 
                                                          
Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008). 
 14  Jurkiewicz, supra note 10, at 6. 
 15  Id. at 6-7. 
 16  Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 265-66. 
 17  Id. 
 18  FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-
COMMERCE: WINE 6 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-
staff-report-concerning-possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-
wine/winereport2.pdf. 
 19  WINE AND SPIRITS DISTRIB. OF ILL., supra note 12. 
 20  Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 266. 
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B.  Intersection with the Commerce Clause: The Wine Wars 
Under the traditional three-tier system, all wine produced 
must go through the several different layers and pass through 
several hands to finally reach the consumer. As the number of 
wineries began to expand exponentially in the 1990s and early 
2000s, the number of wholesalers decreased to only one-sixth of 
that number in the 1960s.21 The three-tier system thus became 
more burdensome on new wineries entering the market. Because 
of the limited number of wholesalers, smaller wineries had a 
much harder time adhering to the regulatory system, since many 
wholesalers found it costly and uneconomical to carry some of the 
smaller wineries’ labels.22 Furthermore, there was no guarantee 
that retailers would likewise make room for those labels on their 
shelves.23 
While the situation seemed to be a lost cause for emerging 
boutique wineries, the increasing trend of the Internet sale of 
commodities, or e-commerce, provided new possibilities for both 
producers and consumers.24 Additionally, some states began al-
lowing interstate direct shipment to consumers beginning in 
198625 with certain limitations. For instance, most states that al-
lowed direct shipment did so with the requirement of reciprocity, 
which allowed out-of-state direct shipment of wines into their 
state only if the exporting states reciprocated by allowing the 
former states’ direct shipments as well.26 For example, beginning 
in 1986, California had a reciprocity arrangement with several 
states.27 In essence, California allowed direct shipment from these 
states while these states would afford the same privilege of direct 
shipments from California. However, most of these states put 
caps on the volume of wine shipments that a consumer could re-
ceive from anywhere.28 Conversely, some states chose not to allow 
any form of interstate direct shipments – few even making it a 
felony to do so.29 
                                                          
 21  James A. Tanford, E-Commerce In Wine, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 275, 
303 (2006). 
 22  FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 6. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Tanford, supra note 21, at 303-04. 
 26  FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 7-8. 
 27   Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473. 
 28  Id. at 8. 
 29  Id. 
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Many of the states’ logic behind regulating wine markets 
was to protect the competitive advantage of the local wineries.30 
By allowing direct shipment of out-of-state wine to consumers, 
states also feared the potential difficulty of collecting taxes in ad-
dition to the potential loss of tax revenue through bypassing the 
three-tier system.31 Some states made an exception by allowing 
direct shipments only from wineries within their borders but pro-
hibiting out-of-state direct shipment.32 This discrepancy brought 
a series of court cases challenging these regulations, which culmi-
nated in the Supreme Court case of Granholm v. Heald. 
C.  Granholm: Analysis of the Court’s Decision & Subsequent 
Interpretations 
1.  Granholm 
The Supreme Court determined the validity of two state 
laws regulating direct shipment of alcohol that treated local win-
eries differently from out-of-state wineries.33 In Michigan, the di-
rect-shipment law at issue specifically required wine producers to 
go through wholesalers with the exception of Michigan’s in-state 
wineries.34 In particular, only in-state producers could obtain a 
license to directly ship to consumers within the state.35 Further-
more, while a small winery could obtain a license for $25, an out-
of-state producer had to apply and pay $300 for a license to sell, 
and even then it could only sell to in-state wholesalers rather than 
consumers.36 New York’s licensing scheme also followed a three-
tier regulatory system but did not explicitly forbid an out-of-state 
wine producer from direct shipment to in-state consumers. In-
stead, it required an out-of-state winery to become a licensed 
New York winery first.37 In practice, an out-of-state winery 
would have to establish a separate branch or some sort of legal 
                                                          
 30  Quigley, supra note 2, at 1184-85. 
 31  Id. at 1185; FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 8. 
 32  FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 3 (stating that in 2003, “more than half 
the states prohibit or severely restrict out-of-state suppliers from shipping wine 
directly to consumers” but “many of these same states, however, allow intra-
state direct shipping, such as from in-state wineries and retailers”). 
 33  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 468-72 (discussing the background and proce-
dural history of the suit in Michigan and the suit in New York). 
 34  Id. at 469. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. at 470. 
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entity within the state of New York.38 The Court recognized from 
the outset that New York’s law was an “indirect way of subject-
ing out-of-state wineries, but not local ones, to the three-tier sys-
tem.”39 
Ultimately, the Court had to decide whether “a State’s 
regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship 
alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state win-
eries to do so, violates the dormant Commerce Clause in light of § 
2 of the Twenty-first Amendment?”40 The Commerce Clause had 
historical roots in the Framer’s desire to ensure that the division 
and disconnected relationships that troubled the Colonies and 
States under the Articles of Confederation would not continue in 
the creation of the Union.41 Thus, the Commerce Clause served a 
purpose of preventing states from discriminating against one an-
other in order to favor their own citizens or benefit their own 
economic interests at the expense of that of another state.42 Ordi-
narily, any state law that violated this principle was per se inva-
lid.43 However, the Supreme Court had to confront the existence 
of the Twenty-first Amendment to inform its understanding of 
the application of the Commerce Clause in the context of alcohol 
regulation. 
§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment explicitly states: “The 
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or posses-
sion of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in the violation of laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”44 
States argued that because the Amendment gave them power to 
regulate alcohol, delivery into the state in violation of the states’ 
regulatory laws would be an explicit violation of the Amendment, 
ultimately calling into question whether the three-tier regulatory 
system was constitutional.45 In addition, the Court had previously 
recognized in North Dakota v. United States that the three-tier 
system was “unquestionably legitimate.”46 However, the Supreme 
                                                          
 38  Id.; Quigley, supra note 2, at 1885. 
 39  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474. 
 40  Id. at 471. 
 41  Id. at 472; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-326 (1979). 
 42  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 
U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
 43  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473; Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 
624 (1978). 
 44  U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 45  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
 46  Id.; North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1986). 
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Court in Granholm held that while the three-tier system was legit-
imate, it still could not violate the Commerce Clause; instead, it 
would only be respected and protected by § 2 when it treated al-
cohol the same across the board, whether it was produced out-of-
state or domestically.47 
Thus, the Court then turned its analysis to whether the 
laws did in fact violate the Commerce Clause by determining 
whether the state, through its regulations, “advances a legitimate 
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”48 Otherwise, the discriminatory 
law is invalid due to its motivation of “simple economic protec-
tionism.”49 Among the legitimate reasons that the state proffered 
that its laws directly addressed were concerns regarding (1) sale 
to minors and (2) tax collection from out-of-state shippers.50 
The Court found unpersuasive the states’ argument that 
the laws at issue aimed to prevent the sale of alcohol to minors. 
The states contended that direct shipment would provide an easi-
er method for minors to access alcohol by just needing a credit 
card and the Internet.51 Primarily, the Court took issue with the 
idea that a law that prevented an out-of-state producer from di-
rectly shipping to consumers would better prevent minors from 
accessing alcohol when the law still allowed in-state direct ship-
ment.52 Furthermore, the Court noted that even in states that al-
lowed direct shipment, there were no reports that minors were 
able to access alcohol more easily.53 Minors, in general, were not 
likely to consume wine or wait several days for it to arrive.54 Fi-
nally, there were many less restrictive means to minimize the 
problem including requiring an adult signature upon delivery.55 
The states’ second contention that the law addressed the 
                                                          
 47 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
 48  Id.; New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). 
 49  United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 331 (2007); Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 270. 
 50  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489; Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 270. 
 51  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
 52  Id. at 490. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id.; FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 12. 
 55  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490-91. See also FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 
38-40 (recommending safeguards against direct shipment of alcohol to minors, 
including requiring adult signature and presentation of valid identification up-
on delivery, providing adequate training to delivery companies, and increasing 
penalties for any shippers that violate regulations set forth to further this inter-
est such as revocation of a license). 
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states’ legitimate interest in tax collection was likewise insuffi-
cient. This argument fell flat on its face in the Michigan case, 
primarily because tax collection occurs directly when out-of-state 
alcohol enters the state rather than relying on wholesalers to col-
lect the tax.56 Thus, the court suggested that safeguards through 
licensing and self-reporting should be adequate for tax collection 
on direct shipments from out-of-state.57 While New York’s tax 
collection practices may have more justification, the Court found 
that there were less restrictive means to achieve their regulatory 
objective.58  For example, New York could implement a require-
ment of a permit for direct shipment and recuperate any potential 
lost tax revenue.59 Furthermore, studies have shown that most of 
the states that have allowed direct shipment from out-of-state 
suppliers have had little to no problems with the collection of ex-
cise taxes.60 Ultimately, the Court respected the states’ interests in 
regulating distribution of alcohol in the interest of “facilitating 
orderly market conditions, protecting public health and safety, 
and ensuring regulatory accountability” but by less restrictive 
means that were not discriminatory to out-of-state businesses.61 
2.  Subsequent Confusion 
a.  Granholm’s reach – inclusive or exclusive? 
Granholm was a victory in some sense for boutique winer-
ies that wished to directly ship to some states that had allowed in-
state direct shipment and forbidden out-of-state direct shipment. 
However, there was still confusion as to whether the nondiscrim-
inatory ideals that Granholm set forth were limited to wineries or 
whether all levels of the three-tier system, specifically retailers, 
deserved the same protection.62 
A view of an expanded scope of Granholm would allow re-
tailers the same protection that producers received from the Su-
preme Court’s ruling. The Eastern District Court of Michigan 
followed the same reasoning and analysis that the Supreme Court 
applied in Granholm and found discriminatory the statute that 
                                                          
 56  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 38. 
 61  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491. 
 62  Quigley, supra note 2, at 1890. 
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prohibited out-of-state retailers from direct shipment while allow-
ing in-state direct shipment. Furthermore, it also found that the 
state’s proffered justifications were not sufficient.63 
However, the proponents of a narrow reading of 
Granholm, primarily wholesalers and state regulatory bodies,64 
argued that the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the “unquestion-
abl[e] legitima[cy]”65 of the three-tier system intended to limit the 
scope of the holding to producers.66 Thus, while direct shipment 
by producers was an exception to that system, the same exception 
could not be afforded to retailers.67 The Second and Fifth Circuits 
adopted this narrow reading of Granholm that statutes allowing 
in-state retailers to directly ship to consumers while preventing 
out-of-state retailers from doing so were constitutional.68 
b.  Regulatory loopholes 
Subsequent to the decision in Granholm, some states were 
directly affected by its ruling and had to make immediate changes 
in their laws while some states that had banned all direct ship-
ment (both in and out-of-state) were unaffected.69 The states that 
were affected had three options in modifying their laws: leveling 
up, leveling down, or leveling sideways.70 With such a process, 
the next issue of confusion centered on laws that were nondis-
criminatory on their face but were potentially discriminatory in 
effect. 
In order to level up, states that had previously allowed in-
state direct shipment and prohibited out-of-state direct shipment 
now allowed any wine producer to obtain a state direct shipping 
permit.71 In such cases, state concerns regarding sale of alcohol to 
minors, as expressed in Granholm,72 were addressed through less 
restrictive means, primarily through requirements of the permit.73 
                                                          
 63  See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1037 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008); Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 275. 
 64  Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 281. 
 65  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
 66  Quigley, supra note 2, at 1892-93; Slaybaugh, supra note 7, at 273. 
 67  Quigley, supra note 2, at 1893. 
 68  See Arnold’s Wine, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 192 (2nd Cir. 2009); 
Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 69  Green, supra note 5, at 39-42. 
 70  Tanford, supra note 21, at 322. 
 71  Id.; Green, supra note 5, at 39. 
 72  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
 73  Tanford, supra note 21, at 323. 
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For example, New Hampshire and California statutes stated that 
any direct shipments of wine required the presentation of identi-
fication to the shipper in order to verify the age of the adult signa-
tory receiving the package and filing periodic reports with the 
regulatory agency of the state.74 
Other states that had not explicitly prohibited out-of-state 
direct shipment leveled up in the way that they regulated out-of-
state direct shipment because the implementations of some of the 
laws that were not discriminatory on their face were so in prac-
tice.75 These included permit costs, case limits and production 
limits.76 In essence, if a state that had regulations that made the 
process for an out-of-state winery to obtain a permit so burden-
some or expensive to the point where it realistically excluded 
them from the market, Granholm held that this was a violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause.77 
In order to level down, states prohibited all direct-
shipments so that none of their state consumers could order any 
alcohol on the Internet.78 Thus, wine drinkers were left to only 
purchase wines face to face at a retail store. In order to obtain 
out-of-state wine, they were essentially required to travel to the 
actual state that the wine was sold. Furthermore, because this 
was not a likely situation in which a consumer would travel thou-
sands of miles just to obtain a bottle or even a case of wine,79 this 
still discriminated against out-of-state wineries.80 
The third phenomenon was a sort of leveling sideways. 
Some states began allowing direct shipment but required that the 
purchase order was face-to-face, typically at the physical winery’s 
premises.81 Again, this allowed access to out-of-state wines only to 
those who had the means to travel to the actual wineries. As a re-
sult, local markets were still essentially closed off except for those 
                                                          
 74  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 178:14-a (2006); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 
23661.3 (2006). 
 75  Tanford, supra note 21, at 323. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474-75 (finding New York’s requirement that an 
out-of-state winery have a branch office in the state as effectively barring that 
winery from the market); Tanford, supra note 21, at 323. 
 78  Tanford, supra note 21, at 324. 
 79  Although theoretically, a consumer can save some costs by ordering in 
large quantities to bring back, some states have limits upon how much an in-
dividual is allowed to bring back across the state’s boundaries. E.g. Ind. Code 
§ 7.1-5-11-15 (2006). 
 80  Tanford, supra note 21, at 324. 
 81  Id. at 325. 
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 102 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 102 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
C M
Y K
Chen Article2.docx (Do Not Delete)  5/21/2014  2:42 PM 
2014 Craft Beer Drinkers Reignite the Wine Wars 537 
few that traveled. 
These changes in laws after Granholm created confusion 
as to whether the Supreme Court truly resolved the tension be-
tween the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause. 
Not surprisingly, cases were filed to test whether revised direct 
shipment legislation adhered to Granholm and the Commerce 
Clause.82 Specifically at issue were the case limits, production 
caps, and on-site purchase requirements, which circuits have ana-
lyzed differently, coming to opposing conclusions.83 The Seventh 
Circuit in Baude II (2008)84 applied the Pike balancing test used 
in Dormant Commerce Clause cases85 to determine the constitu-
tionality of the on-site purchase requirement.86 The Seventh Cir-
cuit found that the requirement was only an incidental burden to 
small out-of-state wineries and that the interest of the state was 
greater in ensuring age verification for alcohol purchases.87 Thus, 
the provision requiring face-to-face onsite purchase as a prerequi-
site to direct shipment was constitutional. 
The Sixth Circuit, however, determined that on-site pur-
chase provisions did in fact burden out-of-state wineries in Cher-
ry Hill Vineyards II (2008).88 The court pointed to the fact that 
customers had to travel far distances just to purchase the wine of 
another state.89 Furthermore, while in-state wineries would bene-
fit from direct shipment, wholesalers also benefitted because out-
of-state wineries were likely to only sell wine through the three-
tier system.90 The court further found unpersuasive the state’s in-
terest in combating underage purchases when there were less re-
strictive means to do so such as delivery requirements of age veri-
fication.91 
                                                          
 82  See Green, supra note 5, at 42-54 (discussing the following cases in 
greater detail). 
 83  Id. at 42. 
 84  See Baude v. Heath (Baude II), 538 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 85  See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (establishing 
the test that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legit-
imate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inci-
dental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clear-
ly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits”). 
 86  Green, supra note 5, at 45. 
 87  Id. at 46. 
 88  Id.; Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly (Cherry Hill Vineyards II), 553 
F.3d 423, 433 (6th Cir. 2008); Quigley, supra note 2, at 46. 
 89  Green, supra note 5, at 46-47. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. 
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The First Circuit addressed the provisions dealing with 
production caps in Family Winemakers II (2010).92 Some states 
like Massachusetts had production caps that allowed direct 
shipment only from small wineries.93 For instance, in Massachu-
setts, where the majority of wineries were relatively small, the 
legislature passed a statute that was facially neutral to both out-
of-state and in-state wineries.94 The First Circuit determined that 
it was discriminatory in effect when looking at the facts specific 
to the wine industry of Massachusetts.95 The law included all of 
the Massachusetts wineries while excluding 607 out-of-state win-
eries that did not meet the threshold (which was 98% of the na-
tionwide production).96 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit in Black Star Farms II (2010)97 
found that production caps as laid out by an Arizona statute were 
not unconstitutional.98 The court focused on the fact that small 
wineries across the board benefited from a less restrictive method 
of distribution while large wineries were incidentally affected.99 
Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiffs had not substan-
tially proven the posited discriminatory effects.100 
With all of these inconsistencies throughout the different 
circuits regarding whether retailers are extended the same protec-
tions that producers received, and whether facially nondiscrimi-
natory laws are sufficient to surpass constitutional muster, it is 
not hard to see that wine drinkers today are still not afforded all 
of the benefits that direct shipment can provide. Furthermore, it 
is a telling tale of the uphill battle that craft breweries, that have 
not necessarily been explicitly afforded Granholm protections as 
wine makers, have in the realm of state regulation in alcohol. 
II.  CRAFT BEER TAKES CENTER STAGE 
While craft beers are abundant today, light lager beers 
                                                          
 92  See Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins (Family Winemakers II), 592 
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2010); Green, supra note 5, at 49-51. 
 93  Green, supra note 5, at 49-51. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  See Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver (Black Star Farms II), 600 F.3d 
1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 98  Green, supra note 5, at 54. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. 
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dominated the beer scene until the late 1970s.101 Many of these 
breweries consolidated to roughly 44 brewing companies.102 
However, as early as 1976, American craft brewing began emerg-
ing, creating unique flavors and character.103 The first recognized 
microbrewery, specifically by the Brewer’s Association, was the 
New Albion brewery in Sonoma, California.104 Three specific 
characteristics that distinguished a brewery like New Albion 
from the large breweries already in the industry were its size 
(produced six million barrels of beer or less annually), its inde-
pendence (more than 75% of the brewery was owned by the craft 
brewer himself), and its commitment to tradition (used techniques 
to enhance rather than lighten flavors).105 Although microbrewer-
ies did not establish a forceful entry into the market during the 
1980s, they did lay a solid foundation and blueprint for other 
craft breweries to gain traction in the 1990s.106 In fact, during the 
first half of the 1990s, craft brewing increased in “annual volume 
growth increasing from 35% in 1991 increasing each year to a 
high of 58% in 1995.”107 The craft brewing industry momentarily 
decelerated between 1997 and 2003 but saw growth again 
through today.108 
Most recently, the industry saw a growth of 15% by vol-
ume and 17% by dollars in 2012 as compared to the previous 
year; nearly 409 breweries (310 microbreweries and 99 brewpubs) 
opened in 2012 alone.109 Several trends in popular culture may 
contribute to the increasing popularity of craft beers among beer 
aficionados. While home brewing of craft beers began as early as 
the 1980s, the “do-it-yourself” mentality that has been heavily 
prevalent in today’s society has encouraged it as a hobby, increas-
                                                          
 101  See BREWERS ASS’N, American Craft Brewer Modern History, 
http://www.brewersassociation.com/pages/about-us/history-of-craft-brewing 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Craft Brewer Mod. Hist.]. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id.; See also MAREEN OGLE, AMBITIOUS BREW: THE STORY OF 
AMERICAN BEER 291-99 (2006). 
 105  BREWERS ASS’N, Craft Brewer Defined, 
http://www.brewersassociation.com/pages/business-tools/craft-brewing-
statistics/craft-brewer-defined (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
 106  Craft Brewer Mod. Hist., supra note 101. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  See BREWERS ASS’N, Craft Brewing Facts, 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/pages/business-tools/craft-brewing-
statistics/facts (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Craft Brewing Facts]. 
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ing the presence of craft beers in popular culture.110 Furthermore, 
current campaigns to “buy local” whether to support local busi-
nesses or for reasons of sustainability have also encouraged the 
attractiveness of craft beer.111 There is some speculation that the 
phenomenon of hipsters among the millennial generation could 
also be another factor in the growing industry of craft brews.112 
III.  CONSUMERS’ NEED FOR PROTECTION 
The landscape of the beer industry has changed signifi-
cantly over the past half-century. After a process of consolidation, 
44 large brewing companies dominated the industry by the late 
1970s.113 As a result, many states passed franchise laws as a check 
on supplier’s power over wholesalers within the three-tier sys-
tem.114 Franchise laws dictate the agreements in which a whole-
saler obtains a right to offer and sell the brewer’s product and of-
ten require permission from the state to terminate the 
relationship.115 While franchise laws were important when mac-
ro-breweries dominated the beer scene and wholesale distributors 
were mostly family owned businesses, the consolidation of players 
on the distribution level has reduced the need for protection.116 
For example, only five main wholesalers control nearly half of all 
business done on this level.117 Thus, the power dynamic has 
turned the tide in favor of wholesalers who support and benefit 
from the three-tier regulatory system118 and franchise laws.119 
                                                          
 110  Kathryn Tuggle, Boomers, Hipsters Brew Up New Hobby, FOXBusi-
ness (April. 6, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-
finance/2012/04/06/boomers-hipsters-brew-up-new-hobby/. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Jeff Glazer, Hipsters and Craft Beer, MADISON BEER REVIEW, April 
(Apr. 19, 2012, http://www.madisonbeerreview.com/2012/04/hipsters-and-
craft-beer.html. 
 113 Craft Brewer Mod. Hist., supra note 101. 
 114  SUSAN C. CAGANN, Contents Under Pressure: Regulating the Sales and 
Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF 
ALCOHOL, 69 (Carole J. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008). 
 115  Id. 
 116  Andrew Tamayo, Comment, What’s Brewing In The Old North State: 
An Analysis Of The Beer Distribution Laws Regulating North Carolina’s Craft 
Breweries, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2198, 2217-18 (2010). 
 117  Alia Akkam & Kristen Wolfe Bieler, Decade in Review 2000-2009: A 
Transformation of the Industry Recapping Ten Extraordinary Years, 
BEVERAGE MEDIA GROUP (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.bevnetwork.com/pdf/jan10_decade.pdf. 
 118  Susan L. Martin, Wine Wars – Consumers and Mom-And-Pop Winer-
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Taking into account the fact that laws governing alcohol 
vary from state to state in general, the laws regarding the sale and 
direct shipment of beer is distinct from that of wine. Unless oth-
erwise specified by state law, the principle held in Granholm only 
extends to the wine industry while beer shipments are still ille-
gal.120 Furthermore, as more and more breweries are getting li-
censes to self-distribute, the issues raised in Granholm regarding 
in-state and out-of-state direct shipment are likely to arise again. 
Similar concerns among consumers exist as a result of 
state restrictions on direct shipment of beer that had existed in 
the wine industry prior to Granholm. Here, craft breweries are 
experiencing the same difficulties in having some wholesale dis-
tributors pick up their label, especially when the distributor is a 
“main brand” distributor and is likely to be selective in choosing 
which brands to carry.121 Thus, when a state completely bans di-
rect shipment, both in and out-of-state, craft breweries that can-
not be picked up by wholesalers are unable to continue their 
business. Even when craft brews are picked up by wholesale dis-
tributors and are forced to proceed through the three-tier system, 
three specific issues concerning consumer rights are still implicat-
ed. First, studies show that consumers denied the option for di-
rect shipment through online purchases will generally pay higher 
prices on alcohol due to the multiple layers of tax as well as 
wholesaler or retailer mark up.122  Second, when states prohibit 
direct shipment through e-commerce, consumer choice greatly 
diminishes. Not all retailers will be able to carry a large variety of 
craft brews, especially if brewed out-of-state. In studying wines, 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) found that the Internet 
offers consumers more variety of boutique wines that were not 
available in retail stores like brick-and-mortar stores.123 In prac-
                                                          
ies vs. Big Business Wholesalers: A Citizens United Example, 21 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (2011) (discussing how the three-tier regulatory system allows 
wholesalers to maintain their position in the alcoholic beverage industry by ex-
ercising their market power and political power). 
 119  Tamayo, supra note 116, at 2218. 
 120  Lisa Rathke, Vermont bill would allow direct shipment of craft brews, 
BURLINGTONFREEPRESS.COM (April 24, 2013), 
http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/viewart/20130424/NEWS07/304240005/V
ermont-bill-would-allow-direct-shipment-craft-brews. 
 121  Tom McCormick, Distribution 101: A short course in distribution ba-
sics, PROBREWER.COM, 
http://www.probrewer.com/resources/library/distribution101.php 
 122  FTC REPORT, supra note 18, at 18-19. 
 123  Id. at 18. 
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tice, allowing out-of-state direct shipment to consumers opens the 
geographic market to the consumer.124 Lastly, consumers have an 
interest in the convenience of obtaining products that they have a 
legal right to purchase.125 
The traditional issues that affected wine drinkers are not 
the only concern that craft beer consumers have to confront. The 
rapidly expanding popularity of craft beers has created another 
phenomenon as a result of the illegality of direct shipment. In 
particular, the heavy use and norm of e-commerce has bred an 
underground black market for craft brews.126 As a result of some 
state laws that outright forbid direct shipment of craft beers, con-
sumers have no other alternative but to turn to illegal Internet 
commerce as a result of the restriction as well as the impracticali-
ty of traveling to other states just to purchase the beverage.127 
Additionally, when the distributors elect to not carry a small label 
from out-of-state, consumers are likewise out of luck in obtaining 
the brew legally. 
The black market circumvents the states’ legitimate right 
to regulate alcohol within its borders.128 Furthermore, it impli-
cates significant consumer rights issues. In general, because no 
enforceable legal relationship exists between seller and buyer in 
an illegal exchange, consumers become vulnerable.129 First and 
most alarmingly, the price for which many of these brews are sold 
drastically exceed the market price had direct shipment from out-
of-state brewers been legal.130 For example, some craft beers are 
routinely resold on eBay for hundreds of dollars.131  Russian Riv-
er Brewing in Santa Rosa, California, produces its flagship Pliny 
the Elder for five dollars a bottle; on the black market, it can go 
for between $15 to $50 per bottle.132 Specifically, in late 2013, a 
                                                          
 124  Id. at 17. 
 125  Id. at 40. 
 126  THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Beer black market exploits enthusiasts, ig-
nores law, TRIB TOTAL MEDIA (Dec. 6, 2013, 6:18 PM), 
http://triblive.com/usworld/nation/5209598-74/beer-brewery-
beers#axzz2uLylCMAy. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Daniel Fromson, Beer’s Black Market, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/beers-black-
market/2011/09/01/gIQAsL0D7J_story.html. 
 129  KATALIN J. CSERES, COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 169 (2005). 
 130  Id. 
 131  THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 126. 
 132  Id. 
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woman in Vermont was charged with selling on Craigslist five 
cases of Heady Topper beer at a whopping price of $825.133 
Although in general, breweries have attempted to discour-
age such practices by threatening to withhold sales to individuals 
that violate these laws,134 actual enforcement is not likely to occur 
and people running makeshift liquor stores on eBay are likely to 
continue without any accountability.135 Brewers that take pride in 
their craft brews often do not wish the consumer to suffer from 
the inflated costs of their product as a result of a black market ex-
change.136 Furthermore, there are serious concerns regarding the 
integrity of the product when a third party, who has no expertise 
in quality control and the nuances of specific brews, resells it on 
the black market.137 For instance, some beers like hoppy India 
pale ales are sensitive to light and heat exposure, which may 
cause them to go rancid.138 Thus, it is in the best interest of all 
parties that regulations better attack the root causes of this grow-
ing black market. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Supreme Court stated in Granholm, the three-tier 
system is “unquestionably legitimate.”139 This Article does not 
suggest that there needs to be an overhaul of the three-tier sys-
tem, especially when there hasn’t been widespread support of an 
absolutely deregulated system.140  However, the traditional sys-
tem, coupled with modified regulations after Granholm still pre-
sent problems for alcohol consumers. This Article argues that the 
three-tier regulatory system should be modified in a way that 
adopts the interests of the consumers, not necessarily as its only 
goal, but definitely at the forefront. As discussed supra in Part III, 
opening up direct shipment as an option for craft breweries, al-
lowing them to self-distribute will ultimately give consumers 
more choice, better prices, and convenience. 
This does not mean, however, that the three-tier regulato-
ry system is useless or counterproductive. In fact, while some 
                                                          
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id.; Fromson, supra note 128. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
 140  Tamayo, supra note 116, at 2226. 
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craft breweries would benefit from direct shipment, other brewer-
ies greatly benefit from their partnerships with wholesale distrib-
utors, especially when the distributor is experienced in the indus-
try and has the resources to distribute at levels that some small 
craft breweries are incapable of doing.141 Instead, especially in 
states that forbid self-distribution and direct shipment, states 
need to recognize whether statutes that put significant limitations 
on a craft brewery’s ability to sell directly to the consumer actual-
ly furthers their state goals. 
Specifically in the context of direct shipment, the Supreme 
Court has already found that there are safeguards against directly 
shipping to minors. Producers can require that delivery services 
obtain an adult signature with presentation of valid identifica-
tion. The FTC has recommended training for all delivery services 
to identify labels that require such procedures. In addition, states 
can impose and enforce strict penalties when a producer violates 
any of these requirements. Furthermore, states that have allowed 
out-of-state direct shipment have reported little to no problems 
with tax collection. Lastly, a state’s interest should be in line with 
the interests of the consumer. Allowing self-distribution as well as 
direct shipment for small breweries would directly tackle this 
phenomenon of the craft beer black market. Such existence jeop-
ardizes the consumer’s right to reasonable prices as well as the 
assurance of quality. As such, state regulations should likewise re-
flect a desire and need to protect the consumer. 
                                                          
 141  Chris Crowell, Craft beer distribution: Study the market, distributors 
and your own operations, CRAFT BREWING BUSINESS (Sept. 10, 2013). 
